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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Inauguration 
At a ceremony in the Kremlin on 7 May, Vladimir Putin was officially installed as 
president of the Russian Federation. Former President Boris Yel'tsin, appearing 
unsteady and pained at times, stood alongside the new president for much of the 
inaugural ceremony. The image of Putin and Yel'tsin together, signifying the 
peaceful transfer of power following an election, marks an extraordinary moment 
in Russian history. Despite misgivings over the installation of Putin as hand-
picked successor, some electoral irregularities, and apprehension over the 
heavy-handedness of Putin's regime, this imperfectly democratic presidential 
succession is a unique event in Russia's troubled political history. It seems 
unwise to deem it a step in the development of democracy, but the celebratory 
emphasis given the ceremony and this method of succession may make it less 
likely that the Russian population would accept less democratic changes in 
leadership. 
 
The head of the Constitutional Court was given a prominent role in the inaugural 
ceremony, although he did not actually swear Putin into office. Putin placed his 
hand on the constitution, the same copy used by Boris Yel'tsin in 1996, and read 
out the text of the oath as stipulated in Article 82 of the constitution. The patriarch 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksei II, was also a high-profile presence at 
the inauguration. Following the ceremony, Aleksei II conducted a service 
honoring Putin and presented him with the icon of St. Prince Aleksandr of Neva 
(Nevsky) to serve as protector of Putin as president. (ITAR-TASS, 1315 GMT, 7 
May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0507, via World News Connection) 
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The advent of Putin's presidency was also noted by the heirs of the former 
Russian tsars. Prince Nikolai Romanov, head of the Imperial family, commented, 
"Russia can hope that it will be in reliable, and ... more practical hands." (ITAR-
TASS, 7 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0507, via World News Connection) 
 
First appointment 
The installation of a new president requires the resignation of the government 
and Kremlin administration. Putin accepted the resignations but requested that 
most staffers remain in their jobs until new appointments were made. Putin's first 
personnel move was to nominate Mikhail Kasyanov as prime minister. Kasyanov, 
who successfully negotiated with the IMF over new loans, had been considered 
the front-runner for the position. His nomination is likely to meet with little 
opposition in the Duma. 
 
Victory Day sparks Stalin revival 
The close proximity of the inaugural and Victory Day celebrations produced a 
disconcerting "coincidence" in the elevation of Putin and the celebration of former 
Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin. Stalin's image will be given unexpected prominence 
on a new commemorative coin issued by the Central Bank. The coin, featuring 
Harry Truman and Winston Churchill along with Uncle Joe, is meant to 
commemorate the 55th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 0440 PDT, 5 May 00; via C-afp@clari.net) For a 
Western audience, the coin is meant to represent a time of Russian and Western 
cooperation. Domestically, however, it is an awkward statement. Stalin has never 
appeared on Soviet or Russian currency before, and most post-Stalin 
administrations have made a point to distance themselves from the brutal leader. 
 
President Putin, however, does not seem concerned by the notion of a cult of 
personality, the likes of which surrounded Stalin. Just two days after his 
inaugural, on Victory Day, Putin unveiled a plaque in the Kremlin to honor the 
heroes of WW II. Once again, Stalin's name appears in the Kremlin etched 
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alongside 16 others, including military leaders Georgi Zhukov, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, and Tito. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 1100 PDT, 9 May 00; via 
C-afp@clari.net) 
 
Putin's first presidential actions 
If actions speak louder than words, Putin's endorsement of free speech was 
ringing terribly hollow following a Federal Security Services (FSB) and tax police 
raid on the offices of Media-MOST Thursday, 11 May, just four days after the 
inaugural ceremony. Media-MOST, whose holdings include NTV, Segodnya and 
Itogi, is headed by financier Vladimir Gusinsky, a rival to Boris Berezovsky. 
Gusinsky's media outlets were less than enthusiastic supporters of Putin and 
have also been somewhat critical of the war in Chechnya. They have also taken 
on the FSB in an investigation of the apartment explosions in Moscow and the 
planted explosives in Ryazan. (UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 11 May 00; 
via C-upi@clari.net) 
 
Putin's administration claims, however, that the raid on MOST's office was 
motivated by recent criminal investigations. Amid the nearly universal 
condemnation of the security services' attack on MOST, FSB officials have 
attempted to justify their action by displaying eavesdropping and intercept 
devices claimed to have been seized in the raid. The intended targets of MOST's 
surveillance are said to include MVD Chief Vladimir Rushailo and several rival 
businessmen. (UPI, 1700 PDT, 13 May 00; via C-upi@clari.net) While it is 
entirely plausible that Media-MOST would possess such equipment (similar 
equipment was found in businesses owned by Berezovsky in the past, when he 
was the target of a politically motivated criminal investigation), it is likely that 
many such offices around Moscow would contain analogous devices. The 
selection of Gusinsky's offices and the timing of the raid make this a particularly 
questionable move that will likely have a further chilling effect on an already 
state-dominated media. It also taints Putin's claims of democratic intentions. 
 
 4 
Decree on regions 
Even before he was named acting president by outgoing President Yel'tsin, Putin 
had stressed the need to adjust relations between the regions and the federal 
center. Most often, Putin stressed the need for a revitalized system of vertical 
power. On Saturday, 13 May, he issued a decree setting out his scheme for 
reasserting federal control of the regions. According to the decree, Putin will 
establish seven vast regional districts, each of which will incorporate several 
republics and territories and will have a presidential representative and staff 
responsible directly to the president. The list of new districts and their capitals 
follows: Central Federal (Moscow); Northwest Federal (St. Petersburg); North 
Caucasus Federal (Rostov-na Donu); Volga Federal (Nizhni Novgorod); Urals 
Federal (Yekaterinburg); Siberian Federal (Novosibirsk); and the Far Eastern 
Federal (Khabarovsk). (ITAR-TASS, 13 May 00; via Johnson's Russia List)  
 
The decree does not elaborate on the exact powers and responsibilities of the 
new presidential representatives, but if federal funding is now to be distributed 
through these new districts, the president should be able to wield considerable 
authority when dealing with regional governors. One of the key failures of the 
previous system of presidential representatives was their reliance on the local 
governors and officials for housing and other expenses. This clearly made them 
susceptible to corruption, and weakened their ties to the federal center. The new 
districts will be entirely federally financed. 
 
In addition to this new decree on regional relations, Putin has also moved to 
bring regional legislation in line with federal laws. Exercising his constitutionally 
provided presidential powers, Putin suspended specific laws enacted by 
Ingushetia, Bashkortostan and in the Amur region. (REUTERS, 14 May 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List) He further suggested that certain regions may need to 





Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
In his recent gestures towards the United States, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin has shown that incumbency comes with its own world-view. Nothing, it 
seems, will be allowed to rock the boat of US-Russian relations before the 
American presidential elections. Instead, Moscow has gone out of its way to 
praise Democratic candidate Al Gore, and to portray him as the natural 
successor to a Clinton administration with whom the Kremlin has been able to do 
business. Stability, it seems, trumps all. 
 
With an eye to the upcoming Moscow visit of US President Clinton, the Kremlin 
has been making every effort to hide embarrassing problems and differing 
opinions. In addition to virtually endorsing Gore for president, Putin's government 
has stymied attempts to investigate financial scandals that might show the White 
House's relations with Russia in an embarrassing light. In Mikhail Kasyanov, 
Putin has found a prime minister with deep knowledge of the controversies 
surrounding US-Russian aid and a similar inclination to let investigations drop. 
 
Although differences between the White House and the Kremlin remain, a Gore 
administration promises the continuation of business as usual, so Moscow thinks. 
 
See no evil 
The Kremlin's first favor to the democratic campaign and to itself has been to 
squash efforts by the US Congress to get Russian cooperation in the 
investigation of the scandal over the theft and laundering of US aid. 
Representative Jim Leach, chairman of the House Banking Committee, arrived in 
Moscow in late April to participate in hearings on money laundering called by the 




Instead, Leach was faced with the first signs that Moscow intends to sweep the 
entire matter under the rug. Sergei Stepashin, the former prime minister who is 
now head of the Audit Chamber, the Russian government's financial watchdog, 
announced that a four-month investigation had failed to find any evidence that 
funds from the International Monetary Fund had been siphoned off and 
laundered through the Bank of New York. (INTERFAX, 0647 GMT, 27 Apr 00: 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0427, via World News Connection) 
 
Stepashin's assurances are difficult to square with the scale and chronology of 
the scandal surrounding the Bank of New York. Lucy Edwards, a former BoNY 
vice president, and Peter Berlin, her husband, pleaded guilty last February to a 
wide range of money-laundering activities; in cooperating with US authorities, the 
couple has admitted to arranging more than 160,000 illegal transactions that 
moved more than $7 billion from Russia. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 25 
Apr 00) The majority of funds was moved shortly after the collapse of the 
Russian ruble in August 1998. The Russian Central Bank is suspected of having 
bypassed the usual currency markets shortly before the ruble's drop in order to 
sell 18 Russian banks more than $4 billion lent by the IMF. There is still strong 
suspicion that the Russian government arranged to give favored bankers the 
chance to get their holdings out of the ruble before the devaluation. 
 
Stepashin and several Duma deputies complained that investigation of the BoNY 
scandal had acquired a "political tinge" in the United States, but at least one 
Moscow newspaper concluded that politics would also make the scandal go 
away. 
 
"What matters most for the United States right now, however, is its forthcoming 
presidential election," Sergei Yegorov of The Moscow News wrote. "The fact that 
president Bill Clinton is arriving in Moscow in June might point to a softening of 
the U.S. position toward Russia. After all, he wouldn't be coming here for the 
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sake of confrontation, would he? Which means that the Bank of New York has a 
reasonably good chance of seeing a happy end to the investigation." (MOSCOW 
NEWS, 4 May 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Back-scratching from Boston to Moscow 
On the topic of the "forthcoming presidential election," the Kremlin has been 
remarkably outspoken. In early May the Russian foreign ministry praised the 
foreign policy agenda laid out by candidate Gore as "fully in tune with the 
Russian approach." Gore had delivered his first major foreign policy speech in 
Boston five days earlier. 
 
The substance of the foreign ministry's statement was not surprising. In an 
attempt to find much of its own rhetoric in Gore's pronouncements, Moscow 
highlighted what it interpreted as Gore's call for cooperation in fighting new 
threats such as "international terrorism," a favorite Kremlin smear of Chechnya's 
rebels. (REUTERS, 1221 ET, 5 May 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The surprise lay instead in the substance of the election campaign speech the 
Kremlin saw fit to endorse. In his address Gore had not only laid out an agenda 
for post-Cold War cooperation with Russia and China, but had attacked 
Republican Party candidate George W. Bush for lacking a credible foreign policy 
agenda and submitting to hawkish ideologues. 
 
"Stuck in a Cold War mindset," Gore said, "Governor Bush continues to view 
Russia and China primarily as present or future enemies." Gore added, "Just this 
past week, Governor Bush used his brief meeting with Russian Foreign Minister 
Ivanov to issue a warning that his intention would be to build and deploy a global 
'Star Wars' system," a project that Gore claimed right-thinking people had long 
ago dismissed. "Governor Bush wishes to return to it, and chose the worst 
possible venue in which to launch -- for lack of a better phrase -- his risky foreign 
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policy scheme." (REMARKS OF AL GORE, International Press Institute, Boston, 
MA, 30 Apr 00; via www.algore2000.com) 
 
For Moscow to endorse an attack on another presidential candidate might seem 
a foolish way to prepare for the unpredictable results of November's elections. 
What, one is tempted to ask, will Russia say if Bush wins? The Kremlin appears 
to have decided that endorsing Gore is worth the risk of slighting his rival. 
 
One hand washes the other. Despite its continuing differences from Washington 
on the ABM Treaty, Kosovo and Chechnya, it seems that the newly installed 
Russian government will refrain from upsetting the democratic campaign. The 
Kremlin apparently believes that the scandals of the recent past can only stay 
buried if both Washington and Moscow remain in safe hands. 
 
Volodya and Yoshi play tough, but nicely 
At their weekend meeting in St. Petersburg last month, Russia and Japan's new 
leaders agreed on little more than their predecessors did. During the three-day 
summit, Russian President Vladimir "Volodya" Putin and Japanese Premier 
Yoshiro "Yoshi" Mori simply agreed to disagree on the Kurile Islands issue while 
simultaneously committing themselves to completing a peace treaty; thus, the 
new leaders placed themselves in precisely the same position as their 
predecessors had in 1997. Since that time, Russo-Japanese relations have been 
stymied by the lack of a peace treaty or a solution to their territorial dispute over 
the Kurile Islands. (REUTERS, 1 May 00; via RussiaToday.com) 
 
Their decision to avoid the peace treaty is hardly surprising, given former 
Russian President Boris Yel'tsin's hastily concluded meeting with Mori's top 
foreign aide and former Premier Ryutaro Hashimoto the weekend prior to Mori's 
trip. The meeting was presumably a last-minute Russian attempt to ensure that 
the issue did not complicate Putin and Mori's informal get-together in St. 
Petersburg. And indeed, the effort seemed to pay off; after their meeting, Mori 
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said that, although they had intended to negotiate the territorial issue, the subject 
simply didn't come up. (CNN.com, 29 Apr 00) But the question remains as to how 
long the two will be able to avoid negotiating this sticky issue. They are already 
scheduled for bilateral talks on the sidelines of the G-8 summit in June, and are 
tentatively scheduled to meet in Japan in late August. If the two are able to 
emerge from these encounters without addressing the subject, they will have 
proven themselves just as adept at the art of avoidance as their predecessors. 
 
Meanwhile, economic relations hardly felt the bump as Putin and Mori glossed 
over the territorial issue. Choosing instead to focus on Putin's love of judo and 
Mori's familial ties to the Russian Far East, the two recalled their "creative 
partnership," and most importantly, their infant trade relationship. According to 
Mori, "extensive economic cooperation" with Russia is a "priority task" for Japan. 
And despite Russia's recent economic woes, creating a "favorable climate for 
development of Japanese-Russian trade and investment" is paramount in this 
task. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 29 Apr 00; FBIS-EAS-2000-0501, via World 
News Connection) However, Russo-Japanese economic cooperation has been 
minimal since private Japanese companies pulled out of Russia during the Asian, 
and subsequently Russian, economic crisis two years ago. As a result, in this 
one area of cooperation, Russia and Japan have quite a few obstacles to 
overcome. Thus, trips to Tokyo by such notable economic personalities as Boris 
Nemtsov and Mikhail Zadornov to meet with Mori are all the more important 
indicators of a concrete Russian desire to open potentially profitable economic 
relations with Japan. These high-profile contacts, as well as numerous Russo-
Japanese economic and business bodies, have been arranged to create the 
foundation for better economic relations. Perhaps practical steps will follow. Until 
then, it will be up to Russia's first diplomat to encourage economic improvements 
while remaining tough on the territorial issue. (RIA, 1407 GMT, 10 May 00; FBIS-




Russian Federation: Media 
By Jonathan Solomon 
 
The hounds are unleashed 
Since Putin came into office in January, the big question in Russian media affairs 
has been what will become of Vladimir Gusinsky's opposition press. NTV, Media-
MOST's flagship outlet and Russia's only nationally broadcasting independent 
station, has been providing relatively unbiased reporting on the Chechen 
campaign, and as such it has not been too flattering towards the government. 
MOST's Segodnya newspaper has often been highly critical of the Putin 
administration as well. MOST-supported outlets not actually in the group, such as 
Novaya gazeta and Obshchaya gazeta, have made names for themselves as 
muckraking papers hostile to the administration's policies, especially fond of 
exposing corruption or "conspiracies." Lastly, MOST supported both YABLOKO 
and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and his Fatherland-All Russia bloc in the 
December Duma elections, and YABLOKO leader Grigory Yavlinsky in the spring 
presidential campaign. Little wonder, then, that Putin has looked to silence 
MOST since taking over for Yel'tsin. 
 
And it appears that all Putin was waiting for to move decisively was the security 
and authority of finally being inaugurated president.  
 
The latest assault on MOST began during the first week of this month. Despite 
highly secretive negotiations regarding repayment of MOST's $211.6 million debt 
to Gazprom, the deputy head of corporate relations at Gazprom, Alexei Kedrov, 
leaked information that the natural gas monopoly sought full control over MOST 
to compensate for the debt. Kedrov stated that Gazprom had rejected MOST's 
initial offer of a generous stock portfolio as debt payment, including a 20% share 
in MOST, 25% of the THT regional television network, and 100% of the Sem 
Dnei (Seven Days) Publishing House, which produces Segodnya and the 
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magazine Itogi. This is in addition to the 30% of NTV that Gazprom already 
owns. 
 
MOST spokesman Dmitry Ostalsky hotly denied that such an offer had even 
been made, however, and observed that, although MOST and Gazprom were in 
debt-settlement negotiations, Kedrov's statements were politically motivated. 
Kedrov shot back in an interview with the Moscow Times that he had documents 
from MOST that proved the content of the offer. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 4 May 
00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) By saying as much, he only confirmed what 
Ostalsky had been hinting at -- that the revelation of the offer was intended to 
embarrass and discredit MOST and Gusinsky. It was a perfect use of 
kompromat. 
 
The next move was a shocker... or perhaps it wasn't, depending on how you view 
it. A little after 9 a.m. Moscow time on 11 May, just four days after Putin's 
inauguration, agents of the tax police, prosecutor general's office, interior 
ministry, and FSB raided all of MOST's Moscow-area offices. The stated intention 
of the search was to gather evidence in a criminal case against members of 
MOST's security service. According to FSB spokesman Alexander Zdanovich, 
several security service officers had been conducting electronic eavesdropping 
on the conversations and telephone calls of MOST employees. Zdanovich did not 
say if the officers were acting on instruction from MOST officials or acting 
independently, and declined to identify specifically those whose privacy had been 
invaded. (INTERFAX, 0805 GMT, 1734 GMT, 11 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0511, 
via World News Connection)  
 
Zdanovich also commented that the prosecutor general's office was the lead 
agency in the investigation, and had called in the others for assistance in the 
raid. Most tellingly, when asked to respond to the allegations by Mikhail Berger, 
the editor of Segodnya, that the raid was partly intended to seize material being 
used in his newspaper's investigation of the FSB's deputy director of economic 
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security, Zdanovich replied that "One could expect that, in a bid to avoid 
punishment, a lawbreaker would try to carry out a preventative strike against the 
relevant law enforcement agency, which deals with economic security issues. 
Criminal structures use tricks like this all the time...." (MOSCOW RIA, 1140 GMT, 
11 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0511, via World News Connection) Later, he added 
that the raids were absolutely not intended to intimidate the opposition press. 
"Nobody is talking about pressuring journalists. Tomorrow, people will be able to 
read Segodnya and watch NTV, which will comment on events as they choose 
to," he said. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 12 May 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
If the raid was intended to collect evidence of illegal espionage by individual 
MOST security officers, and occurred without any condemnation of Gusinsky or 
other executives for ordering such surveillance, then why the apparent 
characterization of the MOST group as a whole as a "criminal structure"? 
Furthermore, why not just flatly deny Segodnya's allegations instead of giving 
them credibility by delving into the "motivations" of Segodnya's investigative 
reporters? Intimating that they are "lawbreakers" and that their intent was to 
publish a compromising article as a "preventative strike" against the FSB is just 
too much to swallow.  
 
Indeed, various factors call into question just how much of a direct role Putin 
could have had in the raids. For one thing, the raids seemed very unorganized -- 
in fact, almost as if the raiders had been assembled at the last minute. A tax 
police spokesman told reporters that, while his service had been involved, none 
of the legal violations being investigated by the raid involved tax issues. The 
prosecutor general's office did take responsibility for initiating the raids, but it was 
the FSB's Zdanovich who made the majority of the public statements regarding 
the raid's intentions. And officials were not very clear on what exactly they were 
investigating. While Zdanovich said that the security officers had been spying on 
MOST employees, Yuri Martyshin, an investigator from the prosecutor general's 
office, said the reason was that the security officers had been conducting 
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industrial espionage on MOST's business rivals. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 12 
May 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) Perhaps the security officers were doing 
one or both -- who knows? The problem lies in the fact that the federal agencies 
involved lacked a common stand on why they were doing what they were doing; 
the last time such confusion occurred was during the muddled Babitsky scandal. 
(See THE NIS OBSERVED, 29 Feb 00)  
 
Even so, the raids served to humiliate MOST and Gusinsky, despite the 
outpouring of support for MOST by the Moscow media outside of the Berezovsky 
group. They also were an ideal lead-in for the real clincher. On 17 May, the 
Central Bank announced that it had imposed "temporary administration" over 
MOST-Bank, the core of Gusinsky's empire and the main source of Media-
MOST's funds. The Central Bank stated that its reason for such an action was to 
"stabilize MOST-Bank's finances and protect its depositors and creditors." (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 17 May 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) The effect which 
the seizure of MOST-Bank will have on Media-MOST's operations is sure to be 
significant, not to mention that the gloves have officially come off in Putin's 
dealings with at least one of the oligarchs. An argument can be made that Putin 
did not pre-authorize the raids, but an action by the Central Bank is sure to have 
been signed off by him. Besides, Putin himself stated at his inauguration that he 
alone is responsible for the actions of the Russian government. If anyone is 
acting outside of his authorization, after making a statement such as that which 
implies that he should be held accountable if a policy or action draws severe fire, 
one can be sure that those acting on their own won't last in their current positions 
much longer. There is no room in this ex-intelligence officer's world for not being 
"on the same team." 
 
Bidders on ORT, Center TV announced... 
State public television network/Berezovsky-run ORT will be bidding to receive a 
new operating license on 24 May, as will Luzhkov-allied Center TV, as per Press 
Minister Mikhail Leslin's announcement on 29 February that the two would not 
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have their licenses automatically renewed. Competing for ORT's Channel One 
frequency are ORT and RTR, the other state-run network. Center TV is up 
against LUKoil's REN-media, a company that produces programs for ORT called 
VID, and another production company, ATV. (MOSCOW RIA, 1220 GMT, 10 
May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0510, via World News Connection) For his part, 
Luzhkov has been fighting the tender in court, as Center TV is the only media 
outlet allied with him and thus a tool of his political survival. On 5 May, the 
Moscow Arbitration Court ruled that the press ministry's declaration that Center 
TV had violated electoral law in its biased support of Fatherland-All Russia during 
the Duma electoral campaign -- which the ministry had used to justify putting the 
outlet up for tender -- was invalid. According to the decision, no specific legal 
violations had been stated. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 5 May 00; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
...As Putin installs his people in ORT... 
In late April, Putin nominated a bloc of candidates for ORT's board of directors. 
These include presidential spokesman Alexei Gromov, ITAR-TASS General 
Director Vitaly Ignatenko, First Deputy Minister of the Press Mikhail Seslavinsky, 
and Presidential First Deputy Chief of Staff Igor Shuvalov. (ITAR-TASS, 1557 
GMT, 29 Apr 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0429, via World News Connection) 
 
In other words, they're clearly HIS people. This leads to the question of what the 
tender for ORT's license means. The installation of his own people in ORT could 
mean that ORT will win back its broadcast license, but the influence of 
Berezovsky will be reduced by virtue of Putin's hand being extended into the 
board of directors. It seems unlikely that Putin would install such high-profile 
officials into ORT if ORT and RTR were to consolidate in the event the latter won. 
But Putin does control RTR rather tightly, and if RTR did win, it would effectively 
cut Berezovsky out of national TV media rather abruptly. So, the question is, 
does Putin want to squeeze or push out Berezovsky from influence. Whether 
ORT or RTR wins not only will tell us which track Putin has decided on, but will 
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also show how Putin views his own political strength, which was in doubt prior to 
the inauguration because of the lack of a clear popular mandate in the election. 
No doubt, his actions here and those already taken against MOST are 
assertations of that power to dull questioning into how politically strong he truly 
is. 
 
...and Berezovsky appears ruffled 
Signs that Putin is indeed strong vis-a-vis the oligarchs come from other sources, 
as well. In the first week of May, Berezovsky's Kommersant newspaper published 
several excerpts from internal Kremlin documents that call for integration of the 
state and FSB apparatus. "The new president, if he really wants to ensure order 
and stability, does not need a self-regulating political system... intellectual, 
personnel, and professional potential in the hands of the FSB should be brought 
in to work for controlling the political process," Kommersant claimed the 
documents to read.  
 
Natalya Timakova of the Presidential Press Service flatly denied the report, 
saying that whatever Kommersant had published had not come from the Kremlin. 
She did admit, though, that "Kommersant may have shamelessly published one 
of their [the Center for Strategic Research, Putin's chief "think-tank"] proposals, 
but that plan has not been approved." 
 
The reporter who published the documents, Nikolai Vardul, insisted that elements 
within the administration had leaked them to him, but that he'd never said that the 
plans had been approved. Speculation emerged that Putin's chief of staff and 
Berezovsky-ally Alexander Voloshin had been the source of the leak. (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 5 May 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
Berezovsky's nervousness about losing his political influence -- or his empire and 
freedom -- is evident in that this leak appeared not in Novaya gazeta, Versiya, 
Obchshaya gazeta, or any other muckraker of recent note, but in Kommersant. 
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True or not, it serves as an attempt at kompromat against Putin in order to 
discredit him via his "plans for an intelligence-state." Most likely, Putin truly does 
intend such a merging of "power agencies" and state apparatus, as the creation 
of the seven administrative districts with "his boys" in key positions shows. 
Berezovsky and Voloshin (who no doubt is not keen on losing political power 
himself) presumably aimed to raise alarm among influential Russians in business 
and government that their very influence is in jeopardy, and Putin needs to be 
challenged, or "engaged" in the very least. What a marked difference from 
Berezovsky's dismissive statements in Vedomosti in late March! (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 4 Apr 00) 
 
The ball is clearly in Putin's possession. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Independent commission on Chechnya formed 
Former justice minister and current head of the Duma's committee on legislation, 
Pavel Krasheninnikov, has been appointed to chair a new independent 
commission investigating the events in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. The 
commission also includes the former presidential candidate, Ella Pamfilova, the 
editor of Izvestia, Mikhail Kozhokin, and writer Yuri Polyakov.  
 
Saddled with an unwieldy title, the National Public Commission for Investigating 
Crimes and Monitoring Respect for Human Rights in the North Caucasus is to 
gather relevant information for the Duma's use, to make recommendations with 
regard to the passage of laws regarding problems in the North Caucasus, to 
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speak with human rights activists both within the federation and abroad, and to 
assist in the formation of a final settlement in Chechnya. (INTERFAX, 1107 GMT, 
18 Apr 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0418, via World News Connection) 
 
It is not entirely clear if this body is to exercise any real degree of independence 
or authority, considering the fact that the Duma has wasted little time lining up 
behind Putin's violent campaign in Chechnya and the vilification of its people. It 
would seem to be little more than a Potemkin commission that can be shown to 
foreigners and the few Russian critics as evidence of the Russian government's 
fair handling of the situation. Indeed, this was the sop thrown to European foreign 
ministers to prevent any meaningful follow-up to PACE's suspension of Russia 
from membership in the Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Back to Peter's City? 
Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev has suggested that the Federal Assembly be 
moved to St. Petersburg, although the capital would remain Moscow. The odd 
request is most likely a political move to put pressure on Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov to provide a suitable location for a new parliament center. Luzhkov has 
suggested some sites on the outskirts of town which Seleznev and others do not 
like. 
 
Perhaps sensing an opportunity, St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev has 
promised to give the parliament the "most beautiful place" in the city, where it 
would be convenient for everyone. He has also come up with a preliminary 
proposal.  
 
The future parliament center would extend from the Smolny along Shpalernaya 
Street to the Tauride Palace. Apparently the area is large enough to construct a 
compound of buildings which could easily house both the Duma and the 
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Federation Council. Who would sit in the historic Tauride Palace has not been 
decided. 
 
The negatives to such a move are clear, but the benefits are not. The move 
would be extremely expensive, logistically challenging, and would make face-to-
face meetings between members of parliament and representatives of the 
legislative and executive branches much more difficult. There would also be the 
additional logistical nightmare of trying to find apartments for Federal Assembly 
members and their staffs, not to mention jobs for their spouses. (ROSSIYSKAYA 
GAZETA, 4 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0504, via World News Connection) 
 
If the proposal is a political tactic to get Luzhkov to give up some attractive site 
for a new parliament complex in Moscow, then it is harmless. If, on the other 
hand, it was sincerely meant, the proposal is both reckless and wasteful. 
 
Putin begins to show regions who's boss 
In a letter sent to the Bashkirian parliament, President Vladimir Putin demanded 
that the republic change several of its laws to bring them in line with federal 
statutes. Presently, Putin charged, Bashkiria has in its constitution text which 
runs "counter to foundations of the federal setup," overriding the Russian 
Federation's state sovereignty and the "supremacy of the Russian Federation's 
Constitution and federal laws" as well as overstepping "the limits of joint 
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Bashkortostan Republic." Indeed, 
the republican constitution pursues "an idea of establishing complete 
international legal sovereignty of the Bashkortostan Republic, including 
independent participation in international and foreign economic relations." (ITAR-
TASS, 1226 GMT, 11 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0511, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The president also ordered the suspension of decrees made by various regional 
leaders, such as those in Ingushetia and in the Amur region. Putin is reportedly 
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drafting some 15 additional edicts annulling regional decrees which contradict 
federal law. (ITAR-TASS, 1212 GMT, 11 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0511, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Clearly the contradictions that exist between federal and regional legislation need 
to be resolved. Time will tell whether Putin can do it when Yel'tsin could not. 
Putin must also remember that many of the regional laws and decrees in 
violation of federal law occurred because the federal government proved 
incapable of addressing the basic needs of the regions, such as a stable 
currency, banking system, etc. The president cannot expect the regions to sit idly 
by while the federal government frets over silly issues such as moving the 
Federal Assembly to St. Petersburg while the most pressing affairs of state go 
unattended. 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Putin approves revised military doctrine 
After two years of bureaucratic haggling and rewrites, President-elect Vladimir 
Putin approved Russia's revised military doctrine on 22 April. Although the 
document does not contain any surprises compared with previous Kremlin policy 
statements, it still deserves study. Interesting aspects of the doctrine are the list 
of external, Western-led "threats" to Russian security, the vaguely defined 
nuclear weapons use policy, and finally, the wartime economic mobilization 
requirement. 
 
The text of the doctrine appeared in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya 
gazeta. Some of the main external "threats" listed include: 1) interference in the 
Russian Federation's internal affairs; 2) attempts to ignore the Russian 
Federation's interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose 
its strengthening as one influential center in a multipolar world; and 3) expansion 
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of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russia's military security. 
The origins of these "threats" are European criticism of Russia's war in 
Chechnya, US-led efforts to gain influence in the Caspian Sea, and, finally, 
NATO expansion. Such a stand clearly demonstrates where Russian and 
Western security interests conflict. Russia probably will not consider itself a 
partner with the West until these issues have been resolved in Moscow's favor. 
 
The doctrine also states that nuclear weapons not only may be used in response 
to attacks of weapons of mass destruction, but also in response to "large-scale 
aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical to the national 
security of the Russian Federation." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 22 Apr 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List) Publicly, Russian officials have promoted the "defensive 
doctrine" as that of a "peaceful state." (ITAR-TASS, 1307 GMT, 24 Apr 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0424, via World News Connection) Unfortunately, these statements 
do not clarify what constitutes "large-scale aggression." The policy's vagueness 
enables the Kremlin to interpret this statement to fit any scenario it perceives as 
threatening Russia's national security.  
 
Finally, the doctrine requires military-industrial mobilization of the economy. In 
peacetime, the document mandates the "creation of conditions ensuring the 
timely switching of industrial enterprises ... to the production of military output." 
During a period of threat and commencement of armed conflict, the doctrine 
specifies "the switching of the country's economy and of individual sectors of it, 
enterprises and organizations, transportation and communications onto a footing 
of work in the conditions of a state of war." These requirements are reminiscent 
of Stalin's mobilization system developed in the 1930s which enabled the Soviet 
Union to defeat Germany in World War II. Then, tanks and airplanes were 
relatively primitive and could easily be mass produced. Today, modern weapons' 
complexity is incompatible with civilian industry. Almost all Western countries 
have scrapped plans for military-industrial mobilization and mass conscription. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 27 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis) This unrealistic economic 
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mobilization requirement is either another indicator of Moscow's attitude toward 
the West, or the result of an intense lobbying effort by Russia's oligarchs. The 
requirement justifies the existence of a disproportionately large, state-supported, 
military-industrial complex which will stifle any fundamental changes in Russia's 
economy. 
 
Although the threat of instability in Russia's border regions is more acute, the 
military doctrine clearly places higher priority on confronting perceived threats 
emanating from the West. Moscow knows its conventional forces are weak, and 
nuclear weapons are its only means of claiming parity with the West. Moscow 
can say the military doctrine is defensive because the country is in no position to 
conduct offensive operations. 
 
New old cruise missiles 
Over the past decade the United States has demonstrated the utility of 
conventionally armed cruise missiles. Since 1991, Tomahawk cruise missiles 
have been launched in eight separate conflicts or operations, most recently in 
1999 during Operation Allied Force in an attempt to end the Kosovo crisis. For 
the US, the cruise missile has become the "Big Stick" when diplomacy fails. The 
utility of conventionally armed cruise missiles has not been lost, and Russia is 
pursuing a variety of cruise missile options, both for their export potential and 
their value in regional conflicts. 
 
Russia is fielding the Raduga Kh-65SE land attack cruise missile, a 
conventionally armed, short-range version of the Kh-55 (AS-15 "Kent") strategic, 
nuclear-tipped, air-launched cruise missile. The missile will be launched from Tu-
160 and Tu-95SM strategic bombers, giving the Russian Air Force the capability 
in regional conflicts to destroy fixed targets from relatively safe standoff ranges 
without resorting to nuclear weapons. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Apr 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0421, via World News Connection) Russia is also offering to 
export the Novator 3M54E1, advertised primarily for its antiship role. The Novator 
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is formerly the nuclear-tipped SS-N-21 "Granat" naval cruise missile. In 1999, 
India bought Novator missiles for its Kilo-class submarines. (JANE'S 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Apr 00)  
 
One advantage of cruise missiles is that they can be launched from a variety of 
platforms: aircraft, ships, and submarines. Rather than rely on ballistic missile 
systems which in most cases can only be launched from land, aircraft, ships, and 
submarines allow cruise missile launch much closer to the target, expanding 
coverage and increasing hit probability. In addition, as ballistic missile defense 
systems proliferate, cruise missiles serve as a means to circumvent these 
defenses. Most ballistic missiles defenses do not have any utility against low 
altitude, subsonic cruise missiles.  
 
These renovated cruise missiles may have limitations, though. First, the 
guidance system may not be accurate enough to achieve an adequate probability 
of kill using a conventional, high explosive, warhead. A nuclear-tipped missile 
does not need to rely solely on its guidance system to deliver the missile on the 
target, because a nuclear warhead's destructive power could compensate for any 
guidance system errors incurred in flight. The much less powerful conventional 
warhead requires a more accurate guidance system; however, it is unclear 
whether these missiles' guidance systems have been improved. To compensate 
for the less destructive warhead and potential errors in flight, more cruise 
missiles must be fired at the same target to ensure a high probability of 
destruction. In addition, the Raduga land attack missiles can only hit fixed targets 
such as buildings; therefore, they will have limited utility combating a mobile 
adversary in Chechnya-type scenarios. Finally, the Novator antiship cruise 
missile was originally designed for open ocean conflict. Most analysts believe 
future naval conflict will take place in the crowded littorals, where the risk of a 
long-range cruise missile hitting a neutral target is much higher. In the early 
1990s, the US Navy removed its long-range, antiship Tomahawk cruise missiles 
from the inventory due to their very limited utility in crowded coastal waters. 
 23 
These limitations do not render the converted missiles ineffective, however, they 
are issues military planners must consider prior to using them. 
 
The conversion of these cruise missiles shows that Russia, despite its present 
economic condition and an expensive war in Chechnya, can still conduct military 
research and development. If these missiles prove successful in conflict, their 
conversion would be a remarkable achievement for the Russian arms industry. 
 
Scratch the surface of the Russian Air Force and see what you find 
From the beginning of the second Chechen War in August 1999, the Russian Air 
Force has waged an effective air campaign. Unopposed by a nonexistent 
Chechen air force, Russian aircraft have strafed and bombed Chechen cities and 
villages, pursued retreating Chechen troops into the southern highlands, and 
provided air cover for Russian ground troops. Reconnaissance aircraft have 
provided important tactical information on troop locations and field conditions. 
According to the federal combined force headquarters overseeing operations in 
Chechnya, Russia's air force has carried out over 42,000 sorties since the 
beginning of the conflict. Front-line aviation (Su-24, Su-25 and others) has 
carried out approximately 12,000 sorties and Mi-24 helicopter gunships have 
made over 30,000. (INTERFAX, 0650 GMT, 28 Apr 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0428, 
via World News Connection) To date, air force casualties in Chechnya have been 
minimal. The Russian Air Force has absolute air superiority and the objectives 
laid out for the air force have been met: destroy all Chechen infrastructure 
believed to support rebel operations, destroy troop formations, and provide air 
support for ground operations. The large number of civilian casualties is not a 
problem because the avoidance of civilian casualties has never been a part of 
the Russian rules of engagement.  
 
So, on the surface the Russian Air Force has painted itself as a very capable, 
successful fighting force. However, as one begins to scratch the surface, it 
becomes clear that the air force has not faced an enemy which it can hold up as 
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a true challenge. There has been no air opposition. The Chechens have no 
mobile or fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, only limited low-tech man-
portable SAMs able to intercept low-flying aircraft. There were some early reports 
of the Chechens receiving Stinger missiles from Afghanistan but there has been 
no confirmed evidence of this. As one scratches the surface more, it becomes 
clear that the Russian Air Force is, in fact, a force made up of aging, 
insupportable aircraft and inexperienced flight and maintenance crews. 
 
The air force has roughly 1,645 tactical aviation aircraft, comprised of the 
following: 
--Bombers/Fighter Ground Attack: some 725, includes 475 Su-24, and 250 Su-25 
--Air-to-Air Fighters: some 415, includes 315 MiG-29, and 100 Su-27 
--Reconnaissance: some 200, includes 40 MiG-25, and 160 Su-24 
--Electronic Counter Measures: 60 Mi-8 
--Training: 245, includes trainers for all fielded tactical aviation aircraft. 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, THE MILITARY BALANCE, 
1998/1999) 
 
While this number is impressive (the United States Air Force by comparison has 
approximately 1,500 plus tactical aviation aircraft), again one must scratch the 
surface to see the reality. Since the establishment of the Russian Air Force in 
1992, the defense ministry has made large cuts in air force manpower and 
aircraft and in the overall defense budget. The most recent of these reductions 
was in 1998 as a result of combining air and air defense forces. Over 30 air 
regiments were disbanded, leaving approximately 70 air regiments. The 
hardware from these disbanded units was either put into storage or distributed 
between the remaining units, allowing the Russians to remove more ailing aircraft 
from the active inventory. The availability of aircraft prior to this reduction was 
assessed at a very low 30-40 percent. Now aircraft availability for tactical aviation 
is assessed at 84 percent. Sounds fairly good; however, scratch the surface and 
one sees that these availability numbers constitute a temporary improvement 
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because of the considerable deterioration of Russian aircraft, airfield facilities and 
airstrips. "Particularly critical is the situation with regard to aircraft engines." 
(JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 1 May 99; via www.proquest.umi.com) 
During 1998, 126 aircraft engines were removed before their service life expired 
because of technical defects. Grounded aircraft are being cannibalized to 
maintain operational aircraft. It is estimated that actual readiness figures are 
closer to 50 percent or lower because of the breakdown of repair facilities and 
availability of spare parts.  
 
Scratch some more. Between 1992 and 1998 there were 30 fatal crashes. The 
Russian accident rate is roughly 3.3-4 accidents per 100,000 flight hours as 
compared to a US military (USAF, USN, and USMC) aircraft accident rate of 1.5 
per 100,000 flight hours. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 22 Sep 98) This 
high accident rate is not only the product of poor aircraft maintenance and 
availability but also of pilot proficiency. Russian pilots receive approximately 25-
30 hours flight hours per year compared to an average 240 hours for US pilots 
and 120-130 for NATO pilots. 
 
Scratch, scratch. These seriously curtailed flight hours are a part of a complex, 
multifaceted equation determining the effectiveness of the Russian Air Force. 
The first variable is the lack of operational aircraft based on poor aircraft 
maintenance, shortage of spares, and reduction of trained maintenance 
personnel and available maintenance facilities. The second variable is the lack of 
sufficient funds for aircraft fuel in order to conduct increased sorties needed for 
training. In recent years, the number of flight training schools and exercises has 
been consistently reduced. The fourth variable is personnel. The air force faces 
many of the same conditions currently experienced by the rest of the Russian 
military. Poor living conditions, low pay (often several months in arrears), and the 
breakdown of discipline and morale have had serious consequences on the 
quality and dedication of newly graduating pilots and the retention of veteran 
pilots. The final variable, and one that impacts all other variables, is the financial 
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situation of the air force. The air force share of the military budget was estimated 
to be 9 percent in 1998 as compared to 20 percent in 1992. In 1998, the air force 
budget requested was 13.51 billion rubles, but it received only 5.455 billion 
rubles. Of this 5.4 billion rubles, 37 percent (2 billion rubles) was allocated to 
military reform (severance pay, transport fees, etc.). (JANE'S INTELLIGENCE 
REVIEW, 1 May 99) The continuing failure to meet basic air force budgets 
impacts not only upon air force operations but also on the research, development 
and fielding of follow-on and advanced aircraft necessary to replace the 
dangerously aging Russian Air Force fleet.  
 
The sum of the equation is that, despite the success of the Chechen air 
campaign, the effectiveness of the Russian Air Force is highly questionable if 
faced with an adversary along the lines of NATO or the US...or in the case of 
broad, sustained or multitheater campaigns. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Russia hardens up its 'soft' CIS rhetoric 
According to Sergei Ivanov, Russia has a warning for CIS members: "Please go 
wherever you want, but face all the consequences." (INTERFAX, 25 Apr 00; via 
lexis-nexis) Ivanov, who is officially head of the Security Council, has increasingly 
assumed the role of ad hoc foreign minister (Igor Ivanov's "'beat"), making official 
statements on all manner of international relations issues. However, this 
comment in particular comes at a time when the CIS is undergoing a resurgence 
of Russian dominance, despite the resistance of several CIS states. Referring to 
Moscow's need to reassert Russian national interests, Sergei Ivanov went on to 
say that "one can't enjoy Russian freebies, pinching our oil and natural gas, and 
simultaneously head for a Greater Romania, for NATO or elsewhere." 
Considering Russia's recent tensions with several CIS states, this statement 
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reads like a country-by-country list of the "anti-Russian" pole of the CIS: GUUAM. 
(Of course, now that Uzbekistan seems intent on following a more pro-Russian 
path, and Moldova is fearful, GUUAM may well become simply GUA.) 
 
With an important heads of state summit approaching in late June, this rift again 
may thwart CIS initiatives. Russia's newfound assertive -- perhaps better termed 
domineering -- attitude illustrated by Ivanov's comments may prove forcible 
enough to push through Russia's newest pet project, the "CIS" Antiterrorism 
Center. According to Executive Secretary Yuri Yarov, the heads of state are 
expected to vote in favor of the Antiterrorism Center that will be headquartered in 
Moscow and "be based on the FSB." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 28 Apr 00; via 
lexis-nexis) The center will have 46 staff officers and will be funded jointly by all 
CIS members through cuts made to the Executive Secretariat's budget. 
(INTERFAX, 28 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The politics of punishment 
The examination into the financial practices of the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) regarding IMF loans is finally coming to a close. With the exception of one 
remaining audit, most facts are now public knowledge. On 4 May, a 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PwC) report showed that Ukraine had overstated its 
reserves in order to qualify for $200 million in IMF loans during 1997; as is the 
case with many scandals, the buildup to the release of this report was more 
interesting than the actual facts discovered. Contrary to suggestions made by the 
media, PwC auditors found that, within the scope of their investigation, Ukraine 
had not misused or misappropriated funds. Most important, the PwC audit largely 
confirmed information already known by the IMF. 
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An IMF press release notes, "Although it discloses some transactions of which 
the Fund was previously unaware, the PwC report confirms the IMF staff's 
understanding of Ukraine's use of its foreign exchange reserves .... The report 
also confirms that, by giving a misleading impression of the size of Ukraine's 
reserves, the NBU's reserve management practices may have allowed Ukraine to 
receive as many as three disbursements ... that it might not otherwise have been 
able to obtain." (IMF NEWS BRIEF NO. 00/26, 4 May 00) According to the IMF, 
those three tranches totaled about $200 million.  
 
Also according to the IMF release, "Once a final determination on misreporting is 
made, the Executive Board will decide what remedial action may be appropriate." 
And therein lies the problem. Over the last year, the IMF has created quite a 
conundrum for itself by disciplining two countries differently for the same 
behavior in which Ukraine engaged. Both Russia and Pakistan recently admitted 
to misleading the IMF about the size of their reserves in order to facilitate the 
release of loan tranches; while Pakistan has been ordered to repay those loan 
tranches, Russia has not.  
 
In fact, on the same day that the IMF Executive Board approved a new $4.8 
billion credit line to Russia, it examined a PwC report that detailed the Russian 
Central Bank's questionable past financial practices regarding IMF loans. In the 
same press release announcing the new credit line, the IMF's directors 
"expressed strong disapproval" that "the balance sheet of the [Russian] Central 
Bank had given a misleading impression of the true state of reserves and 
monetary and exchange rate policies." Without this misleading impression, the 
IMF wrote, "it is possible that one or more of the disbursements of IMF funds to 
Russia in 1996 would have been delayed." (IMF PRESS RELEASE NO. 99/35, 
28 Jul 99) 
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The only remedial action taken against Russia for this inaccurate reporting was 
the condition that the $4.8 billion credit line will be used only to repay past IMF 
loans and will not be routed through the Russian Central Bank. Instead the virtual 
money will remain under IMF control at all times. 
 
The new Pakistan administration, meanwhile, voluntarily approached the IMF 
after discovering that data had been misreported. "As a result of subsequent data 
revisions, Pakistan's budget deficit for 1997/98 was revised upward by 2 percent 
of GDP to 7.5 percent of GDP, and the deficit for 1998/99 was raised by 1.4 
percent of GDP to 5.9 percent of GDP.... Directors expressed serious concern 
that the erroneous data had misled IMF staff and the Executive Board about 
economic performance ...." (IMF NEWS BRIEF NO. 00/23, 28 Apr 00) Pakistan 
then agreed to repay $55 million that had been received based on the incorrect 
data.  
 
Why the discrepancy in punishments? In Le Monde, former IMF Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus wrote, "In Russia, the IMF is merely following a 
policy of seeking to facilitate the continuation of reform measures -- which are, of 
course, too slow." He continued, "The opinion of the Executive Board [is] that 
such a strategy -- which is, of course, not perfect -- is worth trying ... and is 
preferable to Russia's bankruptcy and economic isolation, with all that such a 
development could bring." (LE MONDE, 18 Aug 00; via www.imf.org) 
 
So, which remedy will Ukraine face -- the Russian "engagement" approach or the 
Pakistani "sanction" penalty? So far, it seems to be getting the Pakistani 
treatment. The Financial Times reported, "Stanley Fischer, the IMF's first deputy 
managing director, said ... the Fund would 'make it absolutely clear how 
unacceptable this is' .... Until it was clarified, he said it would be difficult to revive 
the $2.23bn loan program with the IMF that was suspended last year." 
(FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 5 May 00; via lexis-nexis)  
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In the long run, however, when media attention has lessened a bit, it is likely that 
Ukraine will escape this embarrassment with a penalty similar to that of Russia. 
Recent statements of President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright clearly demonstrate that the United States is standing by Ukraine -- 
although hesitantly until the final PwC report is released in June. Prime Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko came away from his meeting with Clinton and IMF officials 
convinced, however, that funding will be resumed in July if reform targets are 
met. Even the IMF has noted that since September of 1998, "new safeguards 
have been put in place and there has been no evidence of similar problems." 
(IMF NEWS BRIEF NO. 00/15, 14 Mar 00)  
 
Opposition clearly exists to continued funding of Ukraine under the current 
system. Anatol Lieven of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told 
Reuters, "We have been through this before. They come to America, they make 
a lot of promises which they mean seriously, and then they go back home and 
run into contemporary realities which make reform extremely difficult." 
(REUTERS, 1922 GMT, 9 May 00; via America Online)  
 
For Ukraine's sake, however, one would hope that the IMF would apply the same 
philosophy to the country that it has applied to Russia. This philosophy was 
discussed by John Odling-Smee, director of the European II Department of the 
IMF, in a Financial Times article. It is a discussion that could just as well have 
been applied to Ukraine. "Of course," he said, "we share the frustration of other 
friends of Russia about the failures of economic policy. But the right response for 
the IMF is to remain engaged in the long, hard business of trying to improve 
policies through persuasion and strict loan conditionality. It is not to stand aside, 
especially when Russia is showing signs of resolve in tackling the difficult 
problems it faces." (FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 23 Aug 99; via lexis-nexis) In 
June, following the IMF Executive Board meeting, it will be clear if this is a 




Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Whereabouts of Uzbek rebel leader once again uncertain 
Mr. Jumaboi Namangani's whereabouts are once more in dispute. The leader of 
a group of Muslim opposition supporters (originally from Uzbekistan) who 
invaded southwestern Kyrgyzstan last fall was believed to have sought refuge in 
Afghanistan last November. However, in late April reports began appearing in the 
media that Mr. Namangani (a.k.a. Khojaev) was actually in Tajikistan. Whether 
he returned there from northern Afghanistan or whether he simply never left Tajik 
territory is still unclear.  
 
In fact, when Mr. Namangani's residence in Tavildora (at the foot of the Pamir 
Mountains) was first reported, the various representatives of the Tajik 
government could not seem to agree whether he was in Tajikistan or not. Amirqul 
Azimov, secretary of the Tajik Security Council, informed journalists on 24 April 
that during his recent trip to Tavildora he had seen no evidence that Mr. 
Namangani and his supporters were anywhere in the region. The Security 
Council secretary led a delegation to Tavildora in late April in order to investigate 
reports that the rebel leader and his supporters had established a permanent 
base of operations there. (ITAR-TASS, 1337 GMT, 24 Apr 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0424, via World News Connection) Only one day after Mr. Azimov had assured 
the public that he had found no trace of Jumaboi Namangani in eastern 
Tajikistan, another member of the delegation, Minister for Emergency Situations 
and Civil Defense Mirzo Ziyo (a former United Tajik Opposition commander) 
reported quite the opposite. Mr. Ziyo stated that he and other members of the 
commission met with the rebel leader and persuaded him to leave Tajikistan with 
his supporters by the beginning of May. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 




On 4 May media sources began reporting that the first group (numbering 
anywhere from 150-400, based on the various accounts) of Mr. Namangani's 
supporters had left Tajikistan the previous evening and had crossed the border 
into Afghanistan. The group was escorted by Tajik defense ministry troops, as 
well as by Amirqul Azimov and Mirzo Ziyo. It is still unclear whether Mr. 
Namangani himself was with the group. (ITAR-TASS, 1333 GMT, 4 May 00; 
FBIS-NES-2000-0504, via World News Connection) A Kyrgyz news agency 
reported on 8 May that, according to "reliable sources" in Dushanbe, the rebel 
leader had remained in Tajikistan and the group which was sent to Afghanistan 
consisted mainly of women and children. (KABAR NEWS AGENCY, 1129 GMT, 
8 May 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The Tajik government's reluctance to admit that Jumaboi Namangani was still on 
its territory is not difficult to understand. Various Uzbek and Russian officials 
have been issuing threatening statements in recent months, warning Tajikistan's 
leaders that, if they are unable to neutralize the "terrorist" groups which have 
allegedly established bases and/or training camps on Tajik soil, the Russian and 
Uzbek armed forces may have to do it for them. Consequently, it is very much in 
the Tajik government's interests to remove Mr. Namangani and his supporters 
from its territory. The Tajik opposition leaders seem to be equally concerned 
about hastening Mr. Namangani's exodus; he and his followers have thus far 
sought refuge in areas where many of the UTO's supporters reside. Should 
Uzbek authorities remain unconvinced of Mr. Namangani's departure and decide 
to conduct more bombing raids over Tajik territory, towns and villages inhabited 
by UTO members' families will suffer the most damage.  
 
However, the Uzbek rebel leader's withdrawal to Afghanistan is hardly a 
permanent solution. Even if Mr. Namangani and his followers are well received in 
Afghanistan (Taliban authorities appear to be willing to consider granting them 
asylum), it is not terribly likely that they will find sufficient resources there with 
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which to construct new homes and livelihoods and eventually they may well 
attempt to reenter Central Asia. (AFGHAN ISLAMIC PRESS NEWS AGENCY, 
1630 GMT, 5 May 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) In fact, 
Mr. Namangani and his supporters have consistently stated that their ultimate 
goal is to return to their home country, Uzbekistan. With the passage of time, the 
rebel leader, and many others like him who have been forced into exile due to 
the Uzbek government's politically repressive policies, may only become more 
desperate to return, prompting them to use ever more violent methods to achieve 
their goals. No doubt in recognition of all these facts, both the UTO and the 
secular Uzbek opposition (led by Muhammad Solih, currently living in exile) have 
called upon the Uzbek government to enter into a dialogue with Jumaboi 
Namangani's group. UTO chairman Said Abdullo Nuri has gone so far as to offer 
to help mediate a settlement between President Karimov's administration and Mr. 
Namangani's refugees. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1500 
GMT, 8 May 00, and 0130 GMT, 4 May 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via 
lexis-nexis)  
 
Summit addresses security threat, but Tajikistan must also look north  
A regional security summit held recently in Tashkent addressed issues of such 
significance that all of the Central Asian presidents except Turkmenistan's 
Saparmyrat Niyazov deemed it necessary to attend in person, rather than 
sending envoys. The summit focused on methods for preventing the spread of 
such phenomena as international terrorism and other forms of "extremism," as 
well as organized crime. All of the presidents seemed to agree that the most 
serious security threats continue to emanate from Afghanistan, which regularly 
provides refuge for various types of terrorist groups. At the summit's conclusion, 
all four presidents signed a statement calling on both the UN and the OSCE to 
work more intensively on finding a peaceful solution to Afghanistan's decade-old 
civil war. The four men also signed an agreement on joint action against any 
future terrorist or "extremist" activity and against international organized crime. 
The main purpose of the agreement's various clauses is to facilitate cooperation 
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between the four states' law enforcement bodies in locating and apprehending 
criminals. All four sides pledged that they would refuse to grant asylum to 
"terrorists and extremists" and that they would strive to uphold mutual extradition 
treaties. (TAJIK TELEVISION FIRST CHANNEL, 1400 GMT, 21 Apr 00; BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The Tajik and Uzbek presidents were the most vocal in their criticism of the 
international community for failing to bring about an end to the Afghan conflict 
more quickly. President Islam Karimov stated that the situation in Afghanistan 
was promoting instability in all of Central Asia, particularly in his own country and 
in Tajikistan. The Uzbek president then once again expressed his view that 
immediate action should be taken to prevent "camps of bandits and saboteurs" 
from flooding the region with "subversive literature" in an effort to win more 
converts to their cause and turn part of Central Asia into an Islamic state. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 Apr 00; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-
nexis) President Imomali Rahmonov echoed the Uzbek president's words, stating 
that "Afghanistan has become a homeland for mercenaries and subversion 
squads." He further stated that it is up to the US and Russia to address this 
problem, albeit under UN auspices. (INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, 21 Apr 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
The Russian government has apparently already decided to devote more 
resources to curbing the spread of narcotics and weapons smuggling, as well as 
"illegal migration" across the Tajik-Afghan border. Colonel-General Nikolai 
Reznichenko, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federal Border Guards 
Service, paid a visit to Dushanbe while the security summit was taking place in 
Tashkent. The main purpose of his trip was to supervise the coordination of 
Russian and Tajik military units in reinforcing the Tajik-Afghan border. (ASIA-
PLUS NEWS AGENCY, 0846 GMT, 20 Apr 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, via lexis-nexis) Although no exact figures have been cited, this 
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reinforcement will undoubtedly require the deployment of additional Russian 
border troops to Tajikistan. 
 
However, in their zeal to neutralize the threat of "terrorism" and "extremism" from 
Afghanistan, the Central Asian presidents appear to have forgotten about similar 
threats from another direction, namely from Uzbekistan. For the past 1 1/2 years 
a wanted criminal, one Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, is suspected to have 
been living in exile in Uzbekistan. Col. Khudoiberdiev vowed to return to 
Tajikistan in an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta shortly after Tajik military 
forces drove him out of Leninobod and back into Uzbekistan. Tajik authorities 
now have reason to believe that the renegade colonel is convening his 
supporters in Termez (in southern Uzbekistan, near the Afghan and Tajik 
borders) in preparation for a new attack on Tajikistan. Possibly in response to 
this threat, Tajik military, police and national security forces conducted joint 
exercises in Leninobod Province on 18 April. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1430 GMT, 18 Apr 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 
via lexis-nexis) Then again, perhaps the Tajik government felt it necessary to 
make a show of force in an area of the country which Uzbekistan occasionally 
treats as its own protectorate and where the border seems to be at least as 
porous as the Tajik-Afghan border has proven to be. When Col. Khudoiberdiev 
undertook his forays across the Uzbek-Tajik border in November 1998, he is 
believed to have done so with a few hundred armed men. Yet his actions were 
observed by only one Uzbek border guard, leading one to conclude that either 
the Uzbek side of the border is almost completely unsupervised, or that the 
majority of Uzbekistan's border guards are both blind and deaf. 
 
In any case, based on empirical evidence, it would seem that since the end of the 
Tajik civil war in 1997, the greatest threat to Tajikistan's security has, in fact, 
come not from Afghanistan, but from Uzbekistan. In addition to Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's 1998 attack on Leninobod, last fall Uzbek airplanes dropped 
bombs on several towns in eastern Tajikistan ostensibly in an attempt to help 
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drive a group of insurgents out of southern Kyrgyzstan. Yet, none of the other 
Central Asian presidents voiced any concerns over Uzbekistan's aggressive 
tactics at the security summit in Tashkent, nor did any of them refer to the danger 
posed by the fact that Col. Khudoiberdiev is still at large on Uzbek territory. 
Perhaps the Russian government should also consider sending border guard 
reinforcements to the Tajik-Uzbek border. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Just who isn't getting the lesson here? 
Well, Russia once again is expressing shock, outrage, and not a little bit of hurt 
because of recent statements made by Vaira Vike-Freiberga. In a BBC interview, 
the Latvian president voiced her concern over the foreign policy stance taken by 
Russia since Vladimir Putin's election, explaining that recent aggressive 
statements should serve as a warning that Russia might again use force against 
the Baltic states. (BBC World Service, 2255 GMT, 30 Apr 00; via 
news.bbc.co.uk) In a speech during her visit to Estonia two days later, Vike-
Freiberga amended her stand slightly, and said that, while the present Russian 
regime posed no direct military danger to the Baltic states, Moscow was seeking 
to regain its world power status. Moreover, she added, there remains a strong 
core of support for the restoration of the Soviet empire. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 2 May 00)  
 
Russia, itself a fountain of goodness and light, expressed its outrage immediately 
with a barrage of denials that it ever would consider such action. A statement 
issued by the Russian foreign ministry asserted that Russia "favors friendly, 
mutually beneficial relations with Latvia and is ready for such." Alas, the 
statement continues, Vike-Freiberga's statement "followed the worst Cold War 
traditions" due to a skewed perception. "Without putting forth any serious 
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reasons -- and there can be none -- the president of the neighboring country 
decided to interpret Moscow's recently approved military doctrine in her own 
way," the ministry said, adding that the doctrine is purely defensive and not 
directed against other countries. (INTERFAX, 1714 GMT, 3 May 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0503, via World News Connection) What an interesting thought.  
 
Apparently definition of the word "defensive" depends on the language of the 
dictionary used. The doctrine, according to the text published recently in 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, indeed allows Russia to defend itself ... against such 
noteworthy enemies as any country that interferes in the Russian Federation's 
internal affairs or even tries to ignore the Russian Federation's interests in 
resolving international security problems, not to mention supporting the 
expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian 
Federation's military security. (See Armed Forces section of THE NIS 
OBSERVED, above) Of course, earlier Russian definitions of interference in the 
country's internal affairs has included criticism of its indiscriminate bombing of 
Chechen civilians. 
 
An Interfax analyst put another noteworthy spin on the controversy. Vike-
Freiberga's comments were intended not only to gain entrance to NATO, but also 
to "make the West tone down its criticism of the country" for alleged "departures 
from international human rights standards." (INTERFAX, 1632 GMT, 3 May 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0503, via World News Connection) It is a little more than slightly 
ironic that Russia would accuse another country of using a smokescreen to 
obscure human rights violations. Russia, we are told, isn't fooled by such tactics, 
and is taking a stand -- on principle -- to shun Latvia. Indeed, the chairman of the 
Russian Duma's committee on international affairs, Dmitri Rogozin, canceled a 
planned visit to Riga because of the controversy. (ITAR-TASS, 1535 GMT, 4 May 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0504, via World News Connection) 
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Latvia isn't the only Baltic country feeling beleaguered by its eastern neighbor, 
either. Speaking in Riga at ceremonies to commemorate Latvia's 10 years of 
independence, Lithuanian Seimas speaker Vytautas Landsbergis declared his 
belief that Russia is exerting constant pressure on the Baltic region in order to 
regain its dominance of the region. (LITHUANIA RADIO, 1100 GMT, 5 May 00; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Certainly Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar had the clearest and most succinct 
analysis of his country's dealings with its neighbor. "Relations with Russia have 
never been better," he said. "This means that we are not at war or occupied." 




And now for the good news... 
Estonia seems to be well on its way into Western structures, according to 
external evaluations. The outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General 
Wesley Clark, reported that Estonia is able to defend itself and is capable of 
meeting the tasks necessary for accession to NATO. However, all obstacles 
have not been overcome, the general noted. The government should continue to 
increase defense spending to at least two percent of GDP, he said, and focus 
more on military training. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 
GMT, 2 May 00) 
 
The subsequent day, another positive evaluation was received, this time from the 
IMF. A delegation headed by Peter Keller expressed its satisfaction with the way 
the government is fulfilling the terms of an economic policy memorandum. In fact, 
due to successful collection of budget revenues and stringent control over 
spending, Estonia ended up with a budget deficit smaller than the limit 
established by the memorandum. The IMF officials also were satisfied with 
government steps to privatize the railways and reform the pension system. 
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(INTERFAX, 1721 GMT, 3 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0503, via World News 
Connection) Indeed, the government has begun to investigate ways of 
disbanding the Privatization Agency, since the agency's work is close to 
completion. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 3 May 00) 
And its budget for 2001-2004 takes into account the requirements for entry into 
both the European Union and NATO. Along the lines suggested by NATO, the 
proposed budget calls for a 26-percent increase in defense spending for next 
year, raising the level to 1.8 percent of GDP, with a further increase to 2 percent 
by 2002. Also included are additional funds to cover the coordination of the 
negotiation process with the EU and information exchanges with the union. 




Revolving door of government opens once again 
A new government, which looks a lot like the old government but with a new 
leader, has taken the reins in Riga. Partisan bickering and conflicts over the 
privatization process sent Andris Skele packing after only nine months in the 
head post. The composition of the new government, led by Riga Mayor Andris 
Berzins, includes a coalition of Latvia's Way, People's Party, the New Party and 
Fatherland and Freedom, allowing for a stronger presence in parliament. Berzins 
determined that former prime ministers cannot hold seats in the cabinet, thereby 
excluding not only Skele but also Valdis Birkavs, who has served as both foreign 
affairs and justice minister. The motivation behind the ban was twofold: to avoid 
the bitter infighting of previous governments, and to reduce the influence by 
business interests on government actions. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 
1144 CET, 5 May 00; via lexis-nexis) 
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